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I.

INTRODUCTION

During the 1970s and 1980s, a great debate raged among academics,
attorneys, bureaucrats, and politicians regarding the nature and function of
U.S. refugee and asylum law.1 The debate centered on which basis—foreign
policy or humanitarianism—should be used for granting protected status to
* A.B. cum laude, Duke University, 2000. J.D. expected with Certificate in Refugees and
Humanitarian Emergencies, Georgetown University Law Center, 2007. The author wishes to thank
the following individuals for their helpful comments: Susan Benesch, Brendon DeMay, David
Koplow, Robert Remes, and Andrew Schoenholtz.
1. See infra Part II.
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an asylum seeker. Holders of the foreign policy view were concerned with
the global political implications of grants of asylum and argued that the
system should be wielded as a tool of foreign policy, just as it had been
throughout the Cold War. U.S. immigration officials pursued this goal by
granting asylum to individuals fleeing U.S. enemies, thus showing those
enemies to be persecutors, and similarly by refusing to grant asylum to
individuals fleeing U.S. allies, in order to avoid making those allies look bad.
Those holding the humanitarian view argued that asylum seekers’ claims
should be adjudicated only through reference to humanitarian factors, such as
past or likely future persecution, and that foreign policy had no legitimate
role in the process.
As I discuss in Part II, after the end of the Cold War the debate appeared to
be over. Humanitarianism, which had been the stated policy of Congress
since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, gained the full backing of the
courts and the executive branch. Because there was no longer a global
ideological battle in which asylum grant rates could play a role, there were
relatively fewer pressures on asylum adjudicators to decide cases based in
part on U.S. foreign policy.
However, the rise of the global War on Terror presents a new ideological
context for asylum adjudications, and a new opportunity for the operation of
foreign policy pressures on the system. In Part III, I use data from the U.S.
Immigration Courts to explore whether these pressures are in fact operating
today in a manner similar to the way they operated during the Cold War. I find
a positive correlation between a country’s status as an ally or enemy of the
United States in the War on Terror and the asylum grant rate for that country.
This result leads me, in Part IV, to conclude that foreign policy is operative in
the asylum adjudication system today, although in a much more subtle way
than it was during the Cold War.
I end the Note with a brief discussion of the “proper” roles of humanitarianism and foreign policy in asylum adjudication, concluding that while both
are always present in the system as inputs, adjudicators should aspire to a
system driven by humanitarianism. To accomplish this, adjudicators should
identify and minimize the effects of foreign policy considerations.
II.

FOREIGN POLICY AND HUMANITARIANISM IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION

Historically there has been a tension between the grant of political asylum
as a humanitarian act and as a tool of foreign policy.2 Both conceptions have

2. See, e.g., Matthew E. Price, Politics or Humanitarianism? Recovering the Political Roots of
Asylum, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 277, 309 (2004); see generally John D. Griffin, The Chinese Student
Protection Act and “Enhanced Consideration” for PRC Nationals: Legitimizing Foreign Policy
While Averting False Positives in Asylum Law, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1105, 1145–56 (1995); Joan
Fitzpatrick and Robert Pauw, Foreign Policy, Asylum and Discretion, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 751,
769 (1992); Arthur C. Helton, Political Asylum under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise,
17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 243 (1984); David A. Martin, The New Asylum Seekers, in THE NEW
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been perennially present in the United States, but for much of the second half
of the twentieth century, coinciding with the height of Cold War politics, the
latter was dominant. For the time being, I will defer addressing the normative
question of whether humanitarianism or foreign policy is the “proper” basis
for making asylum determinations and focus instead on a descriptive approach; I will address the normative question in Section V.
Throughout the 1980s, many commentators identified the presence of
strong foreign policy considerations in the operation of the U.S. asylum
system. For example, in a seminal 1984 article detailing the modern history
of political asylum, Arthur Helton noted that nearly every asylum procedure
used by the United States to date had been either explicitly or implicitly
biased in favor of those seeking refuge from our Cold War enemies.3 Prior to
1968, the two main procedures under which aliens seeking refuge could be
admitted into the United States were strongly biased in favor of those fleeing
U.S. enemies.4 Then in 1968 the United States became a party to the 1967
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, thus binding
itself to apply the refugee definition set forth in the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees.5 This definition is neutral with respect to
foreign policy considerations, making reference only to an individual’s
well-founded fear of persecution.6 However, rather than applying the neutrality of the Protocol, “immigration authorities continued to adhere to tradi-

ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980S 1 (David A. Martin ed., 1988); David A. Martin,
Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247
(1990) [hereinafter Martin, Coast of Bohemia].
3. Helton, supra note 2, at 243–46. See also Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d 1108, 1118–22 (2d Cir.
1990) (examining the history and purpose of the legislation defining U.S. asylum procedures), rev’d
on other grounds, 502 U.S. 314 (1992).
4. These two procedures were conditional entry and the Attorney General’s parole power.
Conditional entry was restricted explicitly to those fleeing persecution in a Communist or Middle
Eastern country, and the Attorney General used his parole power almost exclusively to grant entry to
those fleeing Communism. A third procedure, withholding of deportation, was rarely successful—and
therefore not essential to our discussion—because aliens seeking it were subject to an entirely
discretionary “clear probability” standard, which they rarely met. See Helton, supra note 2, at
243–46; Doherty, 908 F.2d at 1118, rev’d on other grounds, 502 U.S. 314 (1992); see also Note,
Judicial Review of Administrative Stays of Deportation: Section 243(h) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 100 (1976) (finding no published decisions in which
relief had been granted under withholding of deportation).
5. 114 CONG. REC. 29,607 (1968); United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee
Convention]. This note is concerned with the U.S. asylum process, which deals with individuals
already present in the United States, and not the refugee process, which deals with individuals who
are overseas. However, asylees are by definition refugees, because under U.S. law, an individual
present in the United States may be granted asylum only if the Attorney General determines that the
individual meets the refugee definition. INA §§ 208(a)(1), (b)(1). Thus, refugee law and policy will
be addressed insofar as it is relevant.
6. Refugee Convention, supra note 5, at Article 1(A)(2). The Protocol defines a “refugee” as any
person who,
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
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tional, restrictive standards”7 and the Attorney General continued to allow
ideology to dominate decisionmaking.8
Even after the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980,9 which marked a
watershed in congressional attitudes in favor of humanitarianism in asylum
adjudication10 and for the first time codified the foreign policy-neutral
Convention definition,11 “[i]deology continue[d] to dominate asylum decision making, translating into ready asylum grants for applicants who fle[d]
from Communist-dominated regimes, and into far less generous grants for
those who fle[d] regimes with which the United States ha[d] good relations,
irrespective of their human rights records.”12
Echoing Helton’s assessment of the massive influence that Cold War
politics had on refugee and asylum policy, Gil Loescher and John Scanlan,
writing in 1986, note that from the 1950s through the 1980s, “foreign policy
choices ordinarily [played] the key role in determining which refugees
[would] be permitted to enter the United States.”13 They saw as the driving
force behind this foreign policy dominance a group of government insiders,
“[g]uided . . . by the view that ‘each refugee from the Soviet orbit represents
a failure of the Communist system,’”14 who viewed refugees as “valuable
‘assets’ in an ongoing struggle with Communism.”15 Clearly, those charged
with administering the asylum system were slow to implement Congress’s
humanitarian impulse. Loescher and Scanlan’s account garners support from

of that country; or who, not having nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Id.
7. Helton, supra note 2, at 247.
8. Id. at 248.
9. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–212, 94 Stat. 102.
10. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNIFORM APPLICATION OF STANDARDS UNCERTAIN 8
(1987) (affirming that “[o]ne of Congress’ primary objectives in adopting [the Convention refugee
definition] was to eliminate discrimination on the basis of outmoded geographical and ideological
considerations”); see also Martin, Coast of Bohemia, supra note 2, at 1262 (finding that it is clear
from the legislative history that “Congress intended the refugee standards to be applied neutrally and
without ideological bias”); Elizabeth M. Yarnold, The Refugee Act of 1980 and the Depoliticization of
Refugee/Asylum Admissions, 18 AM. POL. Q. 527, 528 (1990) (“[T]he Refugee Act of 1980 clearly
mandates a depoliticization of U.S. refugee and asylum policy.”).
11. In the 1980 Act, Congress defined a refugee as
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person
having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
12. Helton, supra note 2, at 253.
13. GIL LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND AMERICA’S
HALF-OPEN DOOR xvii (1986).
14. Id. at xviii (quoting R. McCollum, U.S. Dep’t of State, ICMC Migration News, Nov.-Dec.
1958).
15. Id. at xvii.
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a 1986 New York Times story about Attorney General Meese’s Justice
Department.16 Reportedly, the Department, concerned that its “asylum policy
[was] inconsistent with [its] foreign policy” because Polish grant rates were
too low in light of the country’s Communist government, proposed new
asylum regulations requiring that all applicants from “totalitarian” governments be presumed to be refugees. Though the presumption did not make it
into the final proposed regulations,17 this account, which was not denied,
gives valuable insight into how foreign policy continued to hold sway well
into the 1980s, at least among decisionmakers in the Justice Department.
A foreign policy bias throughout the 1980s was also demonstrated quantitatively in a series of studies by Elizabeth Yarnold.18 She found that in the
post-1980 period, both the State Department, which was tasked with making
refugee resettlement determinations, and the INS, which decided asylum
claims, granted relief more often to aliens from hostile countries than to those
from non-hostile countries.19 She found that the former were almost 3,500%
more likely than the latter to be recognized by the State Department as
refugees in the period from 1982 to 1985, and were 4% more likely to be
granted asylum by the INS between 1983 and 1985.20
By the end of the 1980s, the humanitarianism of the 1980 Act began to
replace foreign policy as the dominant basis for asylum adjudication. A major
sign of this re-conceptualization came as the claims of persistent adjudicatory
bias, discussed above, culminated in a 1987 class action lawsuit against
Attorney General Meese.21 Brought on behalf of a class of asylum seekers
from two U.S. ally countries—El Salvador and Guatemala—the suit alleged
that the INS and the Executive Office for Immigration Review were biased
against those class members on account of their nationalities.22 Instead of
litigating the case, the government chose to settle. The agreement reached by
the parties and ratified by the court contains strong language forbidding the

16. Robert Pear, Plan to Give More Poles Asylum is under Study by Administration, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
17. See Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,552 (Aug. 28,
1987).
18. ELIZABETH M. YARNOLD, REFUGEES WITHOUT REFUGE: FORMATION AND FAILED IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. POLITICAL ASYLUM POLICY IN THE 1980’S (1990); Yarnold, supra note 10; Elizabeth M.
Yarnold, Federal Court Outcomes in Asylum-Related Appeals 1980-1987: A Highly ‘Politicized’
Process, 23 POL’Y SCI. 291 (1990).
19. Yarnold, supra note 10, at 532.
20. Id. There do seem to be problems with Yarnold’s characterization of the data. Though Yarnold
frames these refugee and asylum grant rates as two instances of the same phenomenon, the vast gap
between them points to a disparity, even in the early 1980s, between State Department and INS
outcomes, and by implication, to a significant difference in the role of foreign policy in the two
agencies. One explanation for the disparity is that refugees identified by the State Department and
asylees identified by the INS were selected from vastly different pools of applicants: the former were
identified overseas in a limited number of pre-selected locations, while the latter were chosen from
among those who traveled to the United States and subsequently applied for asylum.
21. American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 666 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Ca. 1987).
22. Id. at 1360–61; see also BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY
250 (2004).
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use of foreign policy considerations in asylum adjudications:
[U]nder the new asylum regulations as well as the old: foreign policy
and border enforcement considerations; . . . the fact that an individual is
from a country whose government the United States supports or with
which it has favorable relations, . . . [and] whether or not the United
States Government agrees with the political or ideological beliefs of the
individual [are] not relevant to the determination of whether an applicant for asylum has a well-founded fear of persecution.23
The government’s decision to settle the matter and readjudicate the claim of
every class member who had been denied relief was seen by critics as an
admission that adjudication of these claims had been carried out in a biased
manner.24
More evidence that humanitarianism has successfully supplanted foreign
policy as the preferred basis for asylum adjudications came with the Second
Circuit’s decision in Doherty v. INS.25 The court, on its way to determining
that the Attorney General had abused his discretion in denying asylum for
reasons of foreign policy, examined the legislative history behind the 1980
Refugee Act. It found that Congress, “[b]y defining eligibility in politically
neutral terms, . . . made it clear that factors such as the government’s geopolitical and foreign policy interests were not legitimate concerns of asylum.”26
Finally, two reforms internal to the asylum adjudication system also reflect
the rise of humanitarianism. First, the Department of State, which had played
a central role in asylum adjudications by issuing advice letters regarding each
individual asylum case adjudicated by the district offices or immigration
courts, stopped doing so in February 1988.27 While the Department still
receives all asylum files, it now has the option of summarily noting that it has
nothing to add.28 These notations have the effect of “mak[ing] it clearer than
the old form letters did that the Department has nothing to add, . . . [thus
leaving it] more clearly to the immigration judge to decide based on the
record,”29 and not on the basis of foreign policy dictated by the State
Department.
Second, in July of 1990 the INS formed a new professional Asylum Officer
Corps to take over the entire asylum caseload of the “unspecialized, under-

23.
24.

American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 799 (N.D. Ca. 1991).
See, e.g., SARAH IGNATIUS, THE NATIONAL ASYLUM STUDY PROJECT: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
ASYLUM PROCESS OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 19 (1993) (“By settling, the
government implicitly acknowledged serious flaws in its previous asylum adjudication process.”).
25. 908 F.2d 1108 (1990).
26. Id. at 1119, rev’d on other grounds, 502 U.S. 314 (1992).
27. Martin, Coast of Bohemia, supra note 2, at 1311.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1312.
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paid, and overworked” INS Examiners.30 Its formation was aimed at “carry[ing] out the spirit and intent of the Refugee Act of 1980 by applying a single
standard of asylum eligibility, regardless of an applicant’s place [of] origin or
place of adjudication.”31 The regulations establishing the Corps went so far
as to recognize that “the granting of asylum is inherently a humanitarian act
distinct from the normal operation and administration of the immigration
process.”32
Both foreign policy and humanitarianism have, at times, been employed as
the dominant basis for the adjudication of U.S. asylum claims. Through the
Refugee Act of 1980, Congress resolved the tension between the two in favor
of humanitarianism; however, the executive branch failed to relinquish its
foreign policy prerogative. Subsequent legislation, case law, and administrative rulemaking in favor of humanitarianism have more fully constrained the
policymakers. Thus, the use of foreign policy considerations in asylum
adjudications is currently discouraged, if not impermissible, and any apparent bias should be investigated as suspect.33
III.

THE WAR ON TERROR AND FOREIGN POLICY

A. The Cognitive Impact
The attacks of September 11, 2001, triggered the beginning of a new era in
American foreign policy. In serving as the backdrop for the global War on
Terror and constituting George W. Bush’s war presidency, their impact has
been enormous, not only in real terms but also in framing—and thus to a
large extent defining—our country’s post-9/11 reality.
The War on Terror is admittedly not a traditional war. It has taken many
forms and has inspired (or at least influenced) the formation of most
American foreign policy so far this century. Its more notorious characteristics
include its open-endedness, its pervasiveness, and the amorphousness of our
terrorist enemies. First, we are dealing with a long-term engagement. Unlike
in traditional warfare, there is no concrete set of objectives that, once
achieved, will signal our decisive victory; instead, the Bush administration
defines victory as the eradication of global terrorism. While continuing to
maintain that the war is winnable, they concede that we will be fighting the

30. Gregg A. Beyer, Affirmative Asylum Adjudication in the United States, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
253, 274–75 (1992).
31. Id. at 282 (quoting INS Commissioner Gene McNary, Remarks at the Opening of the New
Asylum Offices, Arlington, Virginia (Apr. 2, 1991)) (internal quotes omitted).
32. Id. at 275.
33. At the same time, there are those who argue for a greater role for foreign policy in asylum
adjudications. See, e.g., Price, supra note 2 (arguing from the global history of asylum law that the
United States should favor a political conception of asylum); Griffin, supra note 2 (arguing that the
United States should temper humanitarianism with foreign policy in order to check its “overeager
grants of asylum benefits”). These positions will be discussed further in Part V, infra.
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enemy for a long time to come.34
Second, our enemies are difficult to identify and even harder to fight. This
is perhaps the greatest difference from past wars, up to and including the
Cold War. The paradigmatic terrorist organization, al Qaeda, is decentralized,
operating as a network of loosely affiliated cells that act relatively autonomously. The historically effective U.S. response to hostile enemies—
progressively stronger diplomatic strategies, followed by the threat and
eventually the execution of traditional warfare—has been less than decisive
in dealing with these enemies. While continuing to use traditional tactics
against those territorial states harboring or otherwise supporting our terrorist
enemies, the administration has taken innovative steps designed to more
directly deal with terrorist threats, steps that more closely resemble law
enforcement than warfare.
These law enforcement–like strategies aimed at non-state actors have
defined the War on Terror’s third characteristic, its pervasiveness. It is being
fought globally, regionally, and locally; at home and abroad; and against
citizens, permanent residents, and foreign nationals. Its tactics include
extraordinary rendition, extrajudicial detentions at Guantánamo, domestic
spying, and the designation of individuals as enemy combatants. It has been
used to lend rhetorical support to a diverse set of initiatives, from the war in
Iraq to enhanced U.S. border security. In short, the War on Terror, in serving
as the backdrop for all foreign—and many domestic—policy debates, constitutes the cognitive context for a significant portion of all contemporary U.S.
government decisionmaking.
B. Changes in Immigration Law
Immigration law and policy have played a special role in the prosecution
of the War on Terror. The 9/11 attacks were carried out by foreigners who had
been admitted to the United States as nonimmigrants, and several of the
attackers were in violation of their student visa terms but had not been
subjected to enforcement actions. It is thus not surprising that much of the
government’s post-9/11 restructuring has been directed at the immigration
system.
Three large-scale reforms have been emblematic of this restructuring.
They are the abolition of the INS and the reconstitution of its functions in the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the introduction of major immigration enforcement efforts such as Operation Liberty Shield and the US-VISIT

34. The State Department’s assessment at the beginning of 2002 was that the war was “certain to
last well into the future.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2001 2 (2002),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10319.pdf [hereinafter TERRORISM 2001].
In 2006 they announced that “we are still in the first phase of a potentially long war,” and that “[i]t is
likely that we will face a resilient enemy for years to come.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS
ON TERRORISM 2005 15 (2006), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65462.pdf
[hereinafter TERRORISM 2005].
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program, and various provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act of 200135 and the
REAL ID Act of 200536 designed to make asylum grants more difficult to
achieve. In addition to ostensibly providing tangible security benefits, these
highly publicized and often politically contentious programs have been used
by the administration to send a message of stricter enforcement of our
immigration laws, often at the expense of our nation’s commitment to
humanitarianism.
In establishing DHS, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 defined the
Department’s mission in part as “carry[ing] out all functions of entities
transferred to the Department,”37 including the INS. The drafters, undoubtedly anticipating the institutional difficulties inherent in having a securityminded department administer non-security-related programs such as immigration benefits, also included as part of the Department’s mission “ensur[ing]
that the functions of the agencies and subdivisions within the Department
that are not related directly to securing the homeland are not diminished or
neglected except by a specific explicit Act of Congress.”38 However, no
simple statutory admonishment, standing alone, can overcome the bureaucratic tendencies of a vast government department “whose primary mission is
to protect our homeland.”39 The granting of humanitarian immigration
benefits has certainly suffered since 9/11, due at least in part to this
security-driven governmental reorganization.40
A second post-9/11 immigration law reform was reflected in a number of
immigration enforcement initiatives. These included Operation Liberty Shield,
which mandated detention for the duration of their processing period of
asylum seekers from countries where al Qaeda was active, the detention
without bond of Haitian asylum-seekers,41 and the cracking down on asylumseekers by criminally charging those who tried to enter the United States with
false documents. These initiatives clearly underlined the administration’s
determination to err on the side of security when dealing with humanitarian
immigration benefits.42
The third category of reforms was achieved through the tightening of

35. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
36. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231.
37. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, § 101(D).
38. Id. at § 101(E).
39. See GEORGE W. BUSH, THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 1 (2002), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/book.pdf.
40. See Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Refugee Protection in the United States Post–September 11, 36
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 323 (2005) (“Since September 11th, the United States has focused on
fighting terrorism at a serious cost to our humanitarian programs.”).
41. See, e.g., In re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572 (BIA 2003).
42. See Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Operation Liberty Shield (Mar. 17,
2003), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0115.shtm (last visited Nov.
10, 2006); In re D-J-, 23 I.&N. Dec. 572 (A.G. 2003); Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr,
Detaining and Criminalizing Asylum Seekers, 8 BENDER ’S IMMIGR. BULL. 764 (May 1, 2003). See also
Schoenholtz, supra note 40, at 330–32.
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statutory immigration law. For example, the USA PATRIOT and REAL ID
Acts “significantly broadened the scope of the material support bar [whereby
those who have provided even de minimis material support to a terrorist
organization are barred from entering the U.S.] by expanding the definition
of ‘terrorist activity’ and ‘terrorist organization,’ relaxing the bar’s mens rea
requirement, and limiting the availability of a discretionary waiver.”43 This
material support bar has been used to deny entry to bona fide refugees who
have provided support to rebel groups either under duress or inadvertently.44
In other words, many refugees who are fleeing persecution are denied refuge
in the United States because they were forced to provide minimal services to
armed rebel groups. As outlined above, the strict application of this regulation is indicative of the hard line that DHS and the rest of the administration
is taking in privileging the pursuit of an incremental increase in security over
a fair humanitarian policy.
The War on Terror is being fought on many fronts and has been the
administration’s central foreign policy focus since 9/11. The broad reforms to
national security and immigration law mentioned above, together with
dozens of other government programs, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
ceaseless media coverage—not to mention the initial airliner attacks and the
subsequent London and Madrid bombings—have had the effect of constructing a new reality in which the administration’s foreign policy objectives are
often found to trump the goal of humanitarianism, even when the former are
slight and the latter is compelling.
IV.

THE WAR ON TERROR AND ASYLUM ADJUDICATION

This study is designed to identify any correlation between U.S. foreign
policy objectives in the War on Terror and trends in U.S. Immigration Court
asylum adjudications. As discussed above,45 foreign policy is a disfavored
basis for granting or denying asylum, having given way during the 1980s to
“a finely calibrated individualized judgment of the risk of persecution the
applicant would face in the homeland.”46 However, as Professor David
Martin noted in 1990, “[p]ublic debate on asylum policy . . . proceeds in
cruder terms. Partisans are often ready to make sweeping judgments, by
nationality, about the merit of large groups of asylum-seekers.”47 In the
context of the Cold War, he identified two prominent schools of thought: one
that assumed that virtually anyone fleeing a Communist country would face
persecution upon return, and another that felt the same way about those

43.

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE, UNINTENDED CONSEREFUGEE VICTIMS OF THE WAR ON TERROR 9–10 (2006).
See id. at 22.
See supra Part II.
Martin, Coast of Bohemia, supra note 2, at 1273.
Id.

QUENCES:

44.
45.
46.
47.
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fleeing El Salvador and Guatemala.48 My question is whether and to what
extent a third school has emerged, one that takes as its category of assumed
persecutors those countries that are uncooperative with the United States in
the War on Terror.
A. Methodology: Designating Allies and Enemies
In order to carry out this study, I must first classify countries as enemies or
allies of the United States in the War on Terror. These classifications are
necessarily imperfect; however, I believe that the methods used provide a
reasonable picture of U.S. foreign policy as it relates to terrorism, which in
turn sheds light on the central concern of this paper, bias in asylum
adjudications.
In attempting to classify countries for the purposes of this study, a number
of fundamental difficulties arise. First, terrorism, as defined by the U.S.
Congress, is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”49 Different groups apply the definition in different ways so that one country’s
terrorist is another’s freedom fighter,50 and disagreements about the legitimacy of a given use of force abound. Thus, designations of terrorist
organizations by the State Department are necessarily contingent, resting on
its foreign policy objectives and its bureaucratic biases. However, this
methodological difficulty may be addressed by clarifying the scope of this
paper; it is not my goal to second-guess the State Department in its
designation of foreign terrorist organizations, but instead to explore the
effects of such designations as one of many inputs into the asylum adjudication process.
Second, the definition clearly states that terrorism is violence carried out
by “subnational groups or clandestine agents.”51 Hence, sovereign states, in
supporting terrorism, typically do not deploy their military or engage in other
overt acts tending to indicate involvement. Thus, the degree of a state’s
involvement with terrorist organizations will always be in question, but
again, I will defer to the State Department’s determinations. As an example,
Somalia is an “enemy” for the sake of this study because its “lack of a
functioning central government, protracted state of violent instability, long
unguarded coastline, porous borders, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula
make it a potential location for international terrorists seeking a transit or

48. Id. at 1273–74.
49. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (2000).
50. This is seen clearly in the State Department’s assessment of Syria’s sponsorship of terrorism:
“Syrian officials have publicly condemned international terrorism, but make a distinction between
terrorism and what they consider to be the legitimate armed resistance of Palestinians in the occupied
territories and of Lebanese Hizballah.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2004
90 (2005) [hereinafter TERRORISM 2004].
51. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d).
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launching point to conduct operations elsewhere.”52 Likewise, for the purposes of this study, a failure to crack down on terrorist organizations is taken
as proof of a state’s acquiescence to a terrorist organization’s presence.53
Third, as opposed to the Cold War–era foreign policy paradigm, in which
the power of the Soviet Bloc provided incentives for countries to publicly
identify as “against us,” the post–Cold War hegemony enjoyed by the United
States makes it difficult for most countries to openly defy its foreign policy
objectives. Whereas classifying hostile states during the Cold War was as
simple as identifying those countries with communist, socialist, or leftist
governments,54 today China’s communist government is a strong ally in the
War on Terror.55 The global political situation is fairly dynamic, with a
number of countries becoming at least facially more cooperative with the
United States in the wake of September 11,56 and one—Venezuela—
becoming increasingly antagonistic. Complicating the classification further
is the fact that many states may act hypocritically, declaring their solidarity
with and providing at least token support for the War on Terror, while
acquiescing to the activities of—or being unwilling to control—the terrorist
groups operating within their borders.57
Even given these difficulties, it is possible to construct a table of allies and
enemies of the United States in the War on Terror. For each year in the sample
period, I consulted the annual State Department report on terrorism,58 which
details the extent to which the governments of foreign countries cooperated

52. TERRORISM 2004, supra note 50, at 31.
53. See, for example, Iran’s failure to satisfactorily punish senior al Qaeda members. Id. at 88.
54. See Barbara M. Yarnold, Administrative Policy Making: Adjudication by the Board of
Immigration Appeals in Asylum-Related Appeals 1980-87, 9 POL’Y STUD. REV. 681, 684 (1990).
55. See TERRORISM 2004, supra note 51, at 36 (“China continues to take a clear stand against
international terrorism and is broadly supportive of the global war on terror. China holds regular
counterterrorism consultations with the United States, and is supportive of international efforts to
block and freeze terrorist assets.”).
56. Some of the countries that have become more cooperative have ostensibly done so by choice
(Pakistan, Sudan, Libya, and Syria), and others have been compelled to become more cooperative
through regime change (Afghanistan and Iraq). Cf. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM
20 (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/
counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf (detailing the U.S. strategy of coalition building as (1) working with
willing and able states, (2) enabling weak states, (3) persuading reluctant states, and (4) compelling
unwilling states).
57. Lebanon, Libya, Sudan and Syria have all cooperated in the War on Terror, but each supports
or maintains contacts with terrorist organizations. TERRORISM 2004, supra note 51, at 65–66, 89–91.
58. TERRORISM 2005, supra note 34; TERRORISM 2004, supra note 51; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2003 (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/31912.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2002 (2003),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/20177.pdf [hereinafter TERRORISM 2002];
TERRORISM 2001, supra note 34; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2000 (2001),
available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2000/; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL
TERRORISM 1999 (2000), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/
patterns.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1998 (1999), available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998report/1998index.html; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1997 (1998), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/
1997report/1997index.html; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1996 (1997),
available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1996report/1996index.html.
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with the United States during that year to prosecute and prevent acts of
international terrorism in that country.59 The country-specific entries are
fairly concise, averaging less than one page in length, and I used them to
classify the countries as allies or enemies for that year, based on their tone
and substance. No designation was made if a country was not mentioned in
that year’s report or the description was not sufficiently detailed to allow
classification. The results of this year-by-year classification can be seen in
Table 1.
This table demonstrates that, while most countries have retained their
status as an enemy or an ally of the United States throughout the sample
period, seven countries in the sample—Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan,
Sudan, Syria, and Venezuela—changed from ally to enemy or from enemy to
ally between 2001 and 2003.

B. Asylum Adjudications in Immigration Court
In this study I focus on asylum adjudications in Immigration Courts, the
“trial courts” of the immigration system.60 For those asylum applicants who
are not immediately granted relief by an Asylum Officer (AO), Immigration
Court is their only real chance for a grant. Thorough data on asylum grant
rates in Immigration Court by year and by applicant’s country of origin are
publicly available. Though limited data are also available for asylum adjudications at the administrative appeals level, in the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA), fewer than twenty percent of cases decided in Immigration
Courts are appealed to the BIA.61 Additionally, the widely available BIA data
do not break determinations down by type or country of origin, as do those
from the Immigration Courts, so the analysis that follows would not be
possible with any currently available data set other than that provided by the
Immigration Courts.
Using the ally/enemy determinations made below,62 I analyzed data
provided by the Executive Office of Immigration Review on Immigration

59. This annual report is mandated by and described in 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(a)(3). Please note that
these reports were being compiled before the War on Terror, as such, had begun.
60. There are three procedural paths to political asylum in the United States. First, an asylum
seeker may apply for and be granted asylum affirmatively, by lodging an application with the Asylum
Office of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and undergoing a non-adversarial interview
with an Asylum Officer. If the Asylum Officer finds that the asylum seeker has not met his or her
burden and is thus not eligible for an affirmative grant of asylum, the case is referred to Immigration
Court, an administrative court within the U.S. Department of Justice, which then holds an adversarial
hearing on the merits of the asylum claim. Finally, an individual who is placed in removal hearings in
Immigration Court for any reason at all may raise asylum as a defense against removal, even if he or
she never affirmatively sought asylum before being placed in proceedings.
61. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2005 STATISTICAL
YEAR BOOK Y1 (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy05syb.pdf.
62. See infra Table 1.
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TABLE 1. U.S. ALLIES AND ENEMIES IN THE WAR ON TERROR BY YEAR
1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Afghanistan enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy allya

allya

allya

allya

Azerbaijan

ally

ally

ally

allya

allya

-

-

ally

ally

ally

Bangladesh

-

-

Burma

-

China

-

Colombia

allya

Cuba

enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy

Egypt

-

ally

-

-

-

-

-

-

ally

ally

ally

ally

-

-

-

-

-

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

allya

allya

allya

allya

allya

allya

ally

ally

-

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

Haiti

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

India

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

Iran

enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy

Iraq

enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy allya

Georgia

Kyrgyzstan

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

Lebanon

allyb

allyb

allyb

allyb

allyb

allyb

allyb

allyb

Libya

enemy enemy enemyc enemyc enemyc allyd

allyd

allyd

allyd

ally

ally

ally

-

-

-

-

ally

ally

-

allya

allyb

Nepal

-

allya

North Korea enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy
Pakistan
Russia
Somalia
Sri Lanka

-

enemy enemy enemy enemy ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

ally

-

-

-

-

allya

allya

allya

allya

ally

ally

enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy
ally

ally
allyb

ally

ally

ally

ally

allye

allye

Sudan

enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy

Syria

enemy enemy enemy enemy enemy allyb

allyb

allyb

allyb

Turkey

ally

ally

ally

ally

Venezuela

-

ally
-

ally

ally

-

-

ally

ally

allyb

enemy enemy enemy enemy

a

chaotic
support numerous terrorist groups
c distancing itself from terrorism
d residual contacts with terrorism
e complicated by Darfur
b

Court asylum adjudications from FY 1997 to FY 2005.63 I examined trends in

63. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURTS
FY 2005 ASYLUM STATISTICS (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/FY05AsyStats.pdf;
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURTS FY 2004
ASYLUM STATISTICS (2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/FY04AsyStats.pdf; EXECU-
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grant rates,64 comparing the courts’ treatment of people from states that are
allies and enemies. If the Immigration Courts are operating under a Cold
War–style foreign policy bias, we would expect to discover that enemies
garner higher grant rates than allies, since a high grant rate constitutes a de
facto finding by the U.S. government that the country is persecuting its
citizens.65 Conversely, if asylum adjudications are being conducted in a
manner that is neutral to foreign policy concerns, we would expect grant rates
not to be significantly correlated to ally or enemy status, but instead to be
based primarily on the individualized humanitarian concerns required by the
legal standard, namely the risk of persecution faced in the homeland.66 A
third option, which was neither expected nor seen, would have allies
receiving higher grant rates than enemies.
As shown in Figure 1, there is no significant difference between the
average grant rates of allies and those of enemies in the sample period. Both
fluctuate between 30 and 60 percent, with no discernable temporal trend. In
contrast to asylum determinations during the Cold War, these data tend to
show that the politics of an alien’s country of origin is not currently the
driving force behind Immigration Court asylum determinations.
However, when we focus on those individual countries that have “changed
sides” in the War on Terror, we begin to see a trend. Recall that under a
foreign policy-driven paradigm, we would expect our enemies to have higher
grant rates than our allies. As shown in Figure 2, of the seven countries that
went from enemy to ally or from ally to enemy between 1997 and 2005, six
of them demonstrate a higher grant rate during the period that they were
classified as enemies than they did during the period that they were classified

TIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURTS FY 2003
ASYLUM STATISTICS (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/FY03AsyStats.pdf; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURTS FY 2002
ASYLUM STATISTICS (2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/FY02AsyStats.pdf; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURTS FY 2001
ASYLUM STATISTICS (2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/FY01AsyStats.pdf; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURTS FY 2000
ASYLUM STATISTICS (2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/FY00AsyStats.pdf; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURTS FY 1999
ASYLUM STATISTICS (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/FY99AsyStats.pdf; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURTS FY 1998
ASYLUM STATISTICS (1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/FY98AsyStats.pdf; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURTS FY 1997
ASYLUM STATISTICS (1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/FY97AsyStats.pdf. Please

note that the State Department reports refer to calendar years and the EOIR data is for fiscal years. I
do not believe that this three-month temporal shift is a significant confounding factor in this study
because the relevant trends continue for several years.
64. The asylum grant rate for a country in a given year is the number of successful asylum
petitions (outright and conditional grants) divided by the total number adjudicated on their merits.
Using EOIR’s terminology, the grant rate formula is (GRANTED ⫹ CONDITIONAL) / (GRANTED ⫹
CONDITIONAL ⫹ DENIED).
65. See Price, supra note 2, at 308 (“[G]ranting asylum follows a judgment that the asylumseeker, if refused asylum, would be exposed to a wrongful exercise of political authority.”).
66. See Martin, Coast of Bohemia, supra note 2, at 1273.
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Figure 1. Grant Rates: Average of All Allies and of All Enemies
as allies. Quantifying this, there was a twenty-point difference between the
average enemy and the average ally grant rate: in this group, aliens from
enemy countries were granted asylum 48 percent of the time, while those
from ally countries were granted asylum 28 percent of the time. Taking these
two results together, it appears that, while there is no general relationship
between a country’s ally or enemy status and its asylum grant rate, there is a
correlation between enemy status and grant rate in the period surrounding a
change in the country’s foreign relations with the United States.
V.

ANALYSIS: THIS IS NOT THE COLD WAR

A. Potential Explanations for the Observed Phenomenon
As discussed above, this study shows that while there is no generalized
correlation between a country’s relationship to the United States vis-à-vis the
War on Terror and U.S. asylum grant rates for that country, these two factors
are correlated for those countries that have “changed sides” in the War on
Terror. There are a number of potential explanations for this phenomenon.
First, a regime change brought about by the U.S.-led coalition has the
potential both to change the foreign policy stance of the United States toward
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Figure 2. Longitudinal Grant Rates for Enemy/Ally Countries, 1997-2005
that country and to usher in a more humanitarian regime less apt to persecute
its citizens. This is arguably the case in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the
U.S.-friendly regimes after the respective wars have been less apt to persecute enemies. That is not to say that the situation on the ground is objectively
better for any given sector of the population, only that the government is not
deemed by U.S. Immigration Courts to be active or complicit in persecution,
or unable to control its territory where persecution is occurring.67
Of course, this explanation does not answer, but instead begs, the question
of causality. That is, does a regime change brought about by the United States
tend to lead to a more humanitarian government, under which the level of
persecution declines and is then reflected neutrally by the Immigration
Courts’ determinations? Or are asylum determinations dependent in part on
the foreign policy pronouncements of the State Department, which in turn are
informed by the administration’s political goal of rewarding enemies-turned67. Of course, persecution in Afghanistan and Iraq continues, but its nature has changed, and with
it the numbers of successful asylum seekers. For example, Iraqi individuals seeking asylum based on
past or potential future political persecution by Saddam Hussein’s Baathist Party will not be granted
asylum, but Iraqi Coptic Christians continue to be persecuted on the basis of their religion. Without
access to more detailed data detailing–at a minimum–each asylum seeker’s claimed basis for
persecution and, if denied, the reason for denial of her claim, a more comprehensive picture of the
changing nature of asylum adjudications will remain elusive.
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allies? The truth likely lies somewhere between these extremes.
A second explanation, related to regime change but distinct from it, is that
some governments wanting to get on the “good side” of the United States in
the wake of the War on Terror have tempered their hard-line tactics towards
their people. This may explain Libya’s dramatic drop in grant rates, from 44
percent to 17 percent, after Colonel Qadhafi’s government took dramatic
steps to cooperate with the United States in the War on Terror.68 A similar,
though less dramatic, dynamic may explain the Syrian drop in grant rates.69
However, it should be noted that both Libyan and Syrian nationals apply for
asylum in the United States in very small numbers,70 and for this reason the
grant rates may not be illustrative of any greater trend.
Finally, it is possible that while the humanitarian goal of foreign policy
blindness has to a large extent succeeded by bringing about the nearneutrality of asylum determinations, for those cases where the foreign policy
pressures are particularly strong, the asylum system employs a foreign policy
“release valve” which allows those pressures to become operative. The
mechanism by which this release valve is implemented is unclear, but one
candidate is Walter Lippmann’s “Coast of Bohemia” phenomenon, whereby
decision-makers carry with them a necessarily imprecise, incomplete, and
biased picture of the reality abroad.71 In the contemporary context, the
hypothesis goes, asylum adjudicators import the cognitive impact of the War
on Terror into their determinations.72 Because the discussion of the 9/11
attacks and the subsequent War on Terror has dominated public discourse for
the past five years and has provided the impetus for several major rounds of
legislative, judicial, and administrative lawmaking having a direct impact on

68. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Qadhafi vocally aligned himself with the United
States in the War on Terror, pledging that Libya would “combat members of al-Qaida . . . as doggedly
as the United States” does, and “curtail[ing] its support for international terrorism.” TERRORISM 2002,
supra note 58, at 80. As of 2002, Libya is a party to all twelve international conventions and protocols
relating to terrorism. Id. Additionally, on May 15, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, citing
“the excellent cooperation Libya has provided to the United States and other members of the
international community in response to common global threats faced by the civilized world since
September 11, 2001,” announced that the State Department will remove Libya from its list of state
sponsors of terrorism. Press Release, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Diplomatic Relations with Libya
(May 15, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/66235.htm.
69. See TERRORISM 2002, supra note 58, at 81 (noting that Syria “has cooperated significantly
with the United States and other foreign governments against al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other terrorist
organizations and individuals” and has “discouraged any signs of public support for al-Qaida”).
70. Between FY1997 and FY2005, Libya averaged 3.5 asylum adjudications per year in
Immigration Court, with a high of seven and a low of zero. In the same period, Syria averaged just
under forty-eight per year, with a high of sixty and a low of thirty-six. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, ASYLUM STATISTICS FY 1997-2005, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/
efoia/foiafreq.htm.
71. Martin, Coast of Bohemia, supra note 2, at 1274 (“[T]he real environment is altogether too
big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance . . . . To traverse the world men must have
maps of the world. Their persistent difficulty is to secure maps on which their own need, or someone
else’s need, has not sketched in the [nonexistent] coast of Bohemia.”) (quoting WALTER LIPPMANN,
PUBLIC OPINION 16 (1922)).
72. For a discussion of the factors involved in creating the cognitive impact of the War on Terror,
see supra Part III.A.
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immigration, it is not surprising that the claims of an asylum seeker would be
viewed in light of the significance of his or her sending country to the War on
Terror.
Concededly, today’s asylum adjudication biases are relatively subtle when
compared with those observed during the Cold War. Due in part to those
structural and substantive reforms designed to de-emphasize foreign policy
within asylum adjudication—such as the professionalization of the asylum
corps and the reduction of the State Department’s role in the process73—the
Coast of Bohemia phenomenon appears to have been brought into sharper
relief. However, the bias identified in this study is quite real, and the
cognitive impact of the War on Terror is likely responsible for much of this
bias.
B. Humanitarianism or Foreign Policy: The Normative Question
While not conclusive, this study finds that those countries which the
United States had the most incentive to reward—or, in the case of Venezuela,
to disapprove of—for their stances toward the War on Terror received asylum
grants at rates commensurate with U.S. foreign policy goals.74 While I do not
suggest that Immigration Courts serve as a Cold War–style tool of policy in
their role as asylum adjudicators, these data reveal a bias, whether conscious
or unconscious, individual or structural, that deserves further study. While
humanitarianism is the dominant factor today, asylum grants continue, in
reality, to be the product of both humanitarian and foreign policy pressures,
just as they have been throughout the history of asylum.75 The question, then,
is whether the current mix of humanitarianism and foreign policy—
humanitarianism’s rhetorical and actual dominance, with foreign policy’s
activity at the margins—is the right one for our time. A definitive answer is
beyond the scope of this Note, but a few words are in order.
First, the relationship between humanitarianism and foreign policy should
be situated against the background of the decline of sovereignty and the rise
of non-state actors on the global stage. As the absolute veil of sovereignty
lifts, allowing states to intervene in the sovereign affairs of other states in the

73. See supra text accompanying notes 27–32.
74. Pakistan is the notable exception. Its status as one of the United States’ most steadfast allies
in the War on Terror has been met with a slight increase in asylum grant rate. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 67. Unfortunately, I have no ready hypothesis for this anomaly.
75. See Griffin, supra note 2, at 1155 (“While it is possible . . . that the Refugee Act tolled the
death knell for the legitimacy of foreign policy considerations in all asylum-like determinations, this
conclusion would require evidence that foreign policy considerations are no longer one of the
accepted traditions of common asylum adjudication. But traditions are understandably difficult to
extinguish.”); Price, supra note 2 (arguing from ancient Greek and early modern European practice
that asylum developed as a forthrightly political practice); see also Doris Meissner, Reflections on the
Refugee Act of 1980, in THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980S 57, 64 (David A.
Martin ed., 1988) (arguing that the 1980 Refugee Act established “a process, not a policy” in which
refugee policy has “remained a mirror of our foreign policy,” and that “the two can never be fully
divorced nor should they be”) (emphasis in original).

148

GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:129

case of “humanitarian emergencies,” and as corporations, terrorist organizations, individuals, and other non-state actors become subjects of international
law, the overarching importance of foreign relations as such gives way to a
new balancing of individual and state importance. This new balancing, by
promoting the importance of the individual, links up with the humanitarian
impulse in asylum law.
Second, while humanitarianism is considered by many to be the only
legitimate basis for asylum determinations,76 recently several commentators
have questioned this stance by urging a rehabilitation of the foreign policy
basis. One argument for a more robust foreign policy consideration urges the
maintenance of asylum’s expressive dimension.77 In this view, allowing
asylum’s role as a diplomatic sanction to lapse in favor of a wishy-washy
humanitarianism that equates the victim of state-perpetrated torture with the
victim of an earthquake because they both need assistance “is to miss the
special horror of violence organized and exploited for political ends.”78 In
response, I would simply note that there are many ways to send a diplomatic
message that do not require treating asylum seekers as “political footballs.” If
faced with a choice between a missed opportunity to score geopolitical points
on the one hand and the risk of refouling bona fide refugees fleeing one’s
allies on the other, states should err on the side of humanitarianism.
A second pro-foreign policy argument emphasizes the fact that persecuted
people need a different type of relief—protection from a persecutor—than do
other forced migrants.79 While economic migrants or those fleeing generalized violence may be helped with on-site aid or temporary safe haven in a
neighboring country, “asylum is the only form of effective relief for victims
of persecution, short of military intervention,”80 and thus “those suffering
persecution ought to enjoy a moral priority to asylum over other equally
needy, but non-persecuted, people.”81 However, I believe that a predominantly humanitarian conception of asylum is entirely compatible with this
position. Humanitarianism does not require that adjudicators shut their eyes
to politics, only that they abstain from using individuals to “send a message”
to other states.
A third argument, advanced by John D. Griffin, recommends that foreign
policy’s role as a check on humanitarianism should be explicitly acknowledged in order to counteract overeager grants of asylum by political decision
makers.82 This argument builds on the important result, mentioned above,83
that both foreign policy and humanitarianism are always present in the
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See supra notes 21–33 and accompanying text.
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asylum system, and it embraces the valuable notion that decision makers
should seek to uncover and acknowledge any personal or structural biases in
order to better bring the process in line with aspirational norms. Essential to
his suggestion that foreign policy be used to keep humanitarianism in check,
however, is the fact that Griffin is addressing the more political congressional
and presidential group asylum grants. Applied to the progressively more
non-political situation of individual asylum grants, I believe that an explicit
acknowledgement of the role played by foreign policy should lead to the
limiting of that role.
Ultimately, the continued exercise of foreign policy in asylum adjudications, even in exceedingly small doses, should be recognized and understood
in order to continue to design systems that will limit its operation. The
domain of asylum is the domain of humanitarianism, and every adjudicator
should, as much as possible, promote the dignity of the individual by
affording each applicant a fair hearing, untainted by the tit-for-tat nature of
global politics.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The 1980s saw a shift in attitudes toward the permissible basis of U.S.
political asylum determinations. What had previously been a foreign policy
prerogative was reconceived in humanitarian terms, and slowly the system
changed to eliminate the bias in favor of asylum seekers from Communist
countries. However, despite the humanitarian rhetoric, a grant of asylum
today still constitutes a finding that the sending country engages in, allows, or
is unable to control persecution within its borders. Although this communicative aspect of an asylum grant is unavoidable, the United States government
must treat the negative foreign policy implications of any given grant of
asylum as an unwanted side effect of an obligatory exercise of humanitarianism. In other words, humanitarianism should be the primary concern driving
U.S. asylum adjudication, with foreign policy appearing only as an afterthought. Only when foreign policy has been relegated to such a secondary
role will each individual asylum seeker receive a fair hearing on the merits of
his or her case, and the United States will take seriously its humanitarian
obligation to asylum seekers within its borders.

